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NOTES AND COMMENTS
jeopardy to which his actions have exposed him. Perhaps the cause of
justice would have been better served by an adoption of the approach of
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to the same case.88 That court held:
(1) since the victim was released unharmed the offense could not be
punishable by death and the defendant could waive indictment, (2) that
prosecution by information will be deemed a waiver of the Govern-
ment's right to ask for the death penalty or for the jury to recommend
it, and (3) that, whether waiver is allowed or whether the prosecution
is to be by indictment, no evidence of harm can be introduced unless
such harm is previously alleged so that the defendant will be made com-
pletely aware of the gravity of the charge he faces.
W. TRAWis PORTER
Eminent Domain-Interest As an Element of Just Compensation
North Carolina recognizes the right of every property owner to
receive just compensation for property taken from him under the power
of eminent domain.' When land is taken under this power, the owner
is entitled to receive an amount equal to the value of the land on the
date of the taking.2 If payment is made later than the date of the taking,
then, when made it must include some additional sum as compensation
for the delay,8 because the condemnee has had neither the legal right to
possession or use of his property nor the use of the money owed him
for the deprivation during this interval.4 Failure to compensate for the
resulting loss would be unconstitutional.5 Interest on the principal sum
from the date of the taking is used as a measuring stick for computing
the condemnee's damages resulting from delay in payment.6 This right
' Smith v. United States, 238 F.2d 925, 929-30 (5th Cir. 1956).
1 DeBruhl v. Highway Comm'n, 247 N.C. 671, 102 S.E.2d 229 (1958); Ivester
v. City of Winston-Salem, 215 N.C. 1, 1 S.E.2d 88 (1939); Johnston v. Rankin,
70 N.C. 550 (1874); see generally Comment, 35 N.C.L. Rav. 296 (1957).
'Brooks-Scanlon Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106 (1924); Braswell v.
Highway Comm'n, 250 N.C. 508, 108 S.E.2d 912 (1959) ; Western Carolina Power
Co. v. Hayes, 193 N.C. 104, 136 S.E. 363 (1927).
'United States v. 25.4 Acres of Land, 82 F. Supp. 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1949);
Abernathy v. South & W. Ry., 159 N.C. 340, 74 S.E. 890 (1912).
'United States v. Klamath and Moadoc Tribes, 304 U.S. 119 (1938); United
States v. Northern Pac. Ry., 51 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Wash. 1943); Arkansas-
Missouri Power Co. v. Hamlin, 288 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. App. 1956); Balkey v.
Commonwealth, 394 Pa. 166, 146 A.2d 297 (1958).
'United States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., 329 U.S. 585 (1947) ; Bergen
County Sewer Authority v. Little Ferry, 15 N.J. Super. 43, 83 A.2d 4 (1951);
In re Bronx River Parkway, 284 N.Y. 48, 29 N.E.2d 465 (1940); Annot., 36
A.L.R.2d 337, 428 (1954).
' "The concept of just compensation is comprehensive and includes all elements
.... The owner is not limited to the value of the property at the time of the
taking; 'he is entitled to such addition as will produce the full equivalent of that
value paid contemporaneously with the taking! Interest at a proper rate 'is a good
measure by which to ascertain the amount so to be added.'" Jacobs v. United
States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933).
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to interest is not dependent on statutory provision or an express agree-
ment between the parties, but is an integral part of the just compensation
due the owner.7
The federal courts and a great majority of the state courts allow this
interest as a matter of strict constitutional right.8 It is usually con-
sidered either as payment for damages caused by detention of the com-
pensation9 or as payment necessary to produce a full equivalent of the
value of an award paid contemporaneously with the taking. There seems
to be no valid distinction between the two, since both are based on the
principle of remuneration for loss suffered during the interim.10
North Carolina refuses to allow interest when the owner is permitted
to remain in possession and reap benefit from use of the land during
the interim period."1 Thus in Yancey v. Highway Corn'n 12 where
the petitioners were permitted to harvest crops from the land for two
years after the date of. the original appropriation, the court held that
they were not entitled, as a matter of law, to have interest on the
amount of compensation fixed by the jury. In DeBruhl v. Highway
Com;nn,xS however, where the condemnee was completely deprived of
possession and derived no benefit during the interim, the court held that
he was entitled, ag a matter of law, to have the jury award interest on
the fair market value of the condemned property from the date of the
taking. Yancey was not overruled; it was expressly distinguished on
the ground that the owner in Yancey had derived benefit during the in-
terim and consequently had suffered no 'compensable loss from the
delay in payment.' 4 -The DeBruhl decision was expressly followed in
Winston-Salem v.' Wellsx5 where interest was again allowed as a matter
of law.
It can be argued that the petitioners in Yancey did not receive just
compensation. Even if the owner is not completely deprived of posses-
sion at the time of condemnation his tenure is rendered precarious. All
7 Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937) ; Danforth v. United
States, 102 F.2d 5 (8th Cir. 1939) see generally 29 C.J.S. Emitent Domah§ 333(a) (1941) ; MILLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 175 (1879).
8 Kieselbach v. United States, 317 U.S. 399 (1943) ; United States v. New York,
186 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Stubbs v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 1007 (M.D.N.C.
1938) ; Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 1 v. Key, 99 So. 2d 82 (La. 1958) ; Harrison
v. Louisiana, 11 So. 2d 612 (La. 1942) ; Sowma v. State, 121 N.Y.S.2d 465 (1953);
see generally Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 337, 428-35 (1954).
'See, e.g., DeBruhl v. Highway Comm'n, 247 N.C. 671, 102 S.E.2d 229 (1958).
10 See JAHR, EMINENT DOMAIN § 176 (1953); 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER
EMINENT DOMAIN §5 (2d ed. 1953) ; 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 176(a) (1941).
"Abernathy v. South-& W. Ry., 159 N.C. 340, 74 S.E. 890 (1912). Right of
way was condemned over property on which rental houses were located, but plain-
tiff had continued to rent the houses. The court held that the jury could have
given interest as part of the damages if the circumstances had warranted, but
since no decrease in rent was shown interest was not warranted.
" 221 N.C. 185, 19 S.E.2d 489 (1942).
1 247 N.C. 671, 102 S.E.2d 229 (1958).
1
,1 Id. at 684, 102 S.E.2d at 238.15249 N.C. 148, 105 S.E.2d 435 (1959).
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rights in this property can be exercised only under doubt and uncer-
tainty as to their duration. It is submitted that it is not necessary for
the court either to allow or disallow interest depending upon whether
or not the owner has remained in possession and reaped benefit. It
would seem to be a better rule for the court to allow interest, as a mat-
ter of law, in every case where payment is delayed. In cases where the
landowner has received benefit from retained possession after the date
of appropriation, the court could simply set off the value he has derived
from such retention against the amount of interest allowed as a matter
of law. This rule would facilitate uniformity in the court's decisions and
would guarantee to the owner the just compensation to which he is
entitled, while preventing any over-compensation to which the owner
has no constitutional right. There is supporting authority for this
method in both North Carolina 16 and other jurisdictions. 17
Suppose that in a condemnation proceeding the court awards a judg-
ment which includes compensation for delay in payment, i.e., interest,
in addition to an amount equivalent to the value of the land at the date
of the taking. If this judgment is not paid forthwith, is the condemnee
entitled to interest on the judgment? Where the condemnor is not a
governmental entity, North Carolina allows him to recover interest on
the judgment by statute.' 8 However, where the condemnor is the state
or an agency of the state the cases are not in agreement as to whether
or not interest on the judgment should be allowed. A brief survey of
the cases in this jurisdiction which have dealt with this issue will serve
to indicate an apparent inconsistency in result when the condemnor is
the state or a state agency.
City of Durham v. Davis'9 appears to have been the first case dealing
with the issue of interest on a judgment rendered in condemnation pro-
ceedings against the state or a state agency. In this case the court
awarded the condemnee interest from the rendition of the judgment. In
so doing it cited no authorities and apparently took the view that
interest on a judgment should be awarded as a matter of course. The
court obviously was not impressed with the fact that the condemnor-city
" Cf. Miller v. City of Asheville, 112 N.C. 759, 16 S.E. 762 (1893). In this
case instruction to the jury, that it should allow interest on such sum as it might
assess as damages from the time of the condemnation, but should take into con-
sideration the use made of and benefit received by the plaintiffs from the land after
such date against the damages, was held to be correct
" United States v. Holden, 268 Fed. 223 (D.C.N.Y. 1920) ; Application of Great
Lakes Pipe Line Co., 168 Kan. 100, 211 P.2d 70 (1949) ; Pattison v. Buffalo, R. &
P. Ry., 268 Pa. 555, 112 Atl. 101 (1920); West v. Milwaukee, L.S. & W. Ry.,
56 Wis. 318, 14 N.W. 392 (1882); see generally 2 LEwis, EMINENT DOMAIN§ 499 (2d ed. 1900) ; MILLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 175 (1879).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-5 (1953). "[T]he amount of any judgment... ren-
dered or adjudged in any kind of action ... shall bear interest till paid."1 9171 N.C. 305, 88 S.E. 433 (1916).
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was a governmental entity.20 Some twenty-six years later, however, in
Yancey v. Highway Coma'n2' interest on a judgment against an agency
of the state, previously rendered in the first Yancey case, heretofore
discussed, was denied. The court in reaching this decision relied on the
established principle that "the State, unless by or pursuant to an explicit
statute, is not liable for interest, even on a sum certain which is overdue
and unpaid.' '22 The next case of importance was Highway Comrn'n v.
Privett23 which expressly recognized Yancey second as controlling and
did not allow interest.
In the recent case of Board of Educ. v. McMillan24 the court, relying
on City of Durham v. Davis, allowed interest on the judgment. The
majority opinion did not mention Yancey second or Privett but again
seemed to allow interest as a matter of course. Justice Parker in his
concurring opinion, on the other hand, felt that the instant case had
disemboweled the Yancey secon d decision without expressly referring
to it. He advocated administering "the coup de grace to the Yancey
decision by specifically overruling it.' '2  He stated that "the decision is
wrong, and does violence to Article 1, § 17, of the State Constitution,
and to the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution.!2
It is submitted that McMillan does, in fact, overrule Yancey second
as the concurring opinion suggests. Even assuming that Yancey second
and Privatt can be distinguished from Davis and McMillan on the
ground that the condemnors in the former cases were agencies of the
state7 while in the latter the condemnors were municipal corporations,28
2' Municipal corporations such as counties and incorporated cities and towns are
instrumentalities of the state for the more convenient administration of local
government. See Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907); Gaud v.
Walker, 214 S.C. 451, 53 S.E.2d 316 (1949).
1222 N.C. 106, 22 S.E.2d 256 (1942) (Hereafter referred to as Yancey second).2 2 d. at 109, 22 S.E.2d at 259, quoting United States v. North Carolina, 136
U.S. 211, 219 (1890). The court held that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-5 was not appli-
cable because the state is not bound by a statute unless expressly mentioned therein.
This fteedom from liability for interest is based on the principle of sovereignty.
United States v. North American Transp. & Trading Co., 253 U.S. 330 (1920).
Sovereignty in this interpretation is a carry-over from the common law idea that
"the King can do no wrong" and as such is also the basis for the principle of
sovereign immunity from suit, absent consent. See generally Borchard, Theories of
Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 1 (1926).2-3246 N.C. 501, 99 S.E.2d 61 (1957).
24250 N.C. 485, 108 S.E.2d 895 (1959).2 5 Id. at 492, 108 S.E.2d at 900. 2 250 N.C. at 492, 108 S.E.2d at 900.
27 The State Highway Commission is not a municipal corporation but an agency
of the state created for the purpose of exercising administrative and governmental
functions. See Independence Trust Co. v. Porter & Boyd, Inc., 190 N.C. 680, 130
S.E. 547 (1925).
2 8 A school district is a municipal corporation. See Perry v. Commissioners of
Franklin County, 148 N.C. 521, 62 S.E. 608 (1908) ; Smith v. School Trustees, 141
N.C. 143, 53 S.E. 524 (1906).
The suggested distinction would not seem to constitute an adequate basis for
denying interest on judgments against the state and allowing it as against a mu-
nicipal corporation, because a city theoretically enjoys the same immunity from
suit, absent consent, as does the state. See Note, 36 N.C.L. Ray. 97 n. 4 (1957).
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Yancey second and Privett should fall on constitutional grounds. The
14th Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that a
state cannot take private property for public use without awarding just
compensation.29 North Carolina recognizes this right to just compen-
sation as an integral part of the law of the land and declares that law
of the land and due process are synonymous.8 0 Interest, as compensa-
tion for delay in payment, is an essential element of just compensation.3 '
It is contended that there is no substantial difference between delay in
payment of the principal sum due the owner of condemned land and
delay in payment of the judgment rendered on that sum, delay in either
case being simply a description of the interval existing between the date
of the taking and the date of payment. Consequently, interest on the
judgment until final payment, compensating for this delay, is constitu-
tionally guaranteed. The general rule that a state or state agency is not
required to pay interest should, therefore, be held inapplicable to liabili-
ties arising from the exercise of the power of eminent domain.3 2
RICHARD S. JONES, JR.
Insurance-Insurer's Liability for Death or Loss Resulting
from Violation of Law
A felon flees the scene of a burglary with the police in hot pursuit.
In the chase his wife's car is wrecked and he is injured. Under the
wife's accident insurance policy covering the driver and containing no
exception for injuries sustained in violation of law, may he recover his
medical expenses? The Supreme Court of Michigan, in Davis v. De-
troit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch.,' said that he could. Recovery was allowed
in the absence of a provision in the policy excepting the risk and in the ab-
sence of proof that the policy had been obtained in contemplation of the
commission of a felony. The court further stated that this construction
would not encourage crime or be contrary to public policy.
A vigorous dissent argued that generally one may not recover when
the crime involved is one of moral turpitude. Since the policy provided
" Slattery Co. v. United States, 231 F.2d 37 (5th Cir. 1956); Creasy v.
Stevens, 160 F. Supp. 404 (W.D. Pa. 1958) ; Riden v. Philadelphia, B. & W.R.R.,
182 Md. 336, 35 A.2d 99 (1943) ; Spaugh v. City of Winston-Salem, 234 N.C. 708,
68 S.E.2d 838 (1952); Board of Educ. v. Campbells Creek R.R., 138 W. Va.
473, 76 S.E.2d 271 (1953) ; see generally 18 Am. JuL. Eminent Domain § 4 (1938).
11 E.T. & W.N.C. Transp. Co. v. Currie, 248 N.C. 560, 104 S.E.2d 403 (1958) ;
Sale v. Highway Comm'n, 242 N.C. 612, 89 S.E.2d 290 (1955) ; Eason v. Spence,
232 N.C. 579, 61 S.E.2d 717 (1950).
" Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299 (1923) ; see generally
1 ORGEL, op. cit. .stpra note 10, § 6.
" See United States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 341 U.S. 48 (1951) ; United
States v. Thayer-West Point Hotel Co., 329 U.S. 585 (1947) ; Smyth v. United
States, 302 U.S. 329 (1937); Highway Comm'n v. Stupenti, 222 Ark. 9, 257
S.W.2d 37 (1953) ; Sholars v. Highway Comm'n, 6 So. 2d 153 (La. App. 1942).
1356 Mich. 454, 96 N.W.2d 760 (1959).
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